5879f0d649
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-8619.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-1981.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-2197.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-usb-ehci-oob-read.patch: New files. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu)[source]: Add patches.
95 lines
4 KiB
Diff
95 lines
4 KiB
Diff
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:17:20 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] e1000: eliminate infinite loops on out-of-bounds transfer
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start
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The start_xmit() and e1000_receive_iov() functions implement DMA transfers
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iterating over a set of descriptors that the guest's e1000 driver
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prepares:
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- the TDLEN and RDLEN registers store the total size of the descriptor
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area,
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- while the TDH and RDH registers store the offset (in whole tx / rx
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descriptors) into the area where the transfer is supposed to start.
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Each time a descriptor is processed, the TDH and RDH register is bumped
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(as appropriate for the transfer direction).
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QEMU already contains logic to deal with bogus transfers submitted by the
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guest:
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- Normally, the transmit case wants to increase TDH from its initial value
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to TDT. (TDT is allowed to be numerically smaller than the initial TDH
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value; wrapping at or above TDLEN bytes to zero is normal.) The failsafe
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that QEMU currently has here is a check against reaching the original
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TDH value again -- a complete wraparound, which should never happen.
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- In the receive case RDH is increased from its initial value until
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"total_size" bytes have been received; preferably in a single step, or
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in "s->rxbuf_size" byte steps, if the latter is smaller. However, null
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RX descriptors are skipped without receiving data, while RDH is
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incremented just the same. QEMU tries to prevent an infinite loop
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(processing only null RX descriptors) by detecting whether RDH assumes
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its original value during the loop. (Again, wrapping from RDLEN to 0 is
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normal.)
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What both directions miss is that the guest could program TDLEN and RDLEN
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so low, and the initial TDH and RDH so high, that these registers will
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immediately be truncated to zero, and then never reassume their initial
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values in the loop -- a full wraparound will never occur.
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The condition that expresses this is:
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xdh_start >= s->mac_reg[XDLEN] / sizeof(desc)
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i.e., TDH or RDH start out after the last whole rx or tx descriptor that
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fits into the TDLEN or RDLEN sized area.
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This condition could be checked before we enter the loops, but
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pci_dma_read() / pci_dma_write() knows how to fill in buffers safely for
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bogus DMA addresses, so we just extend the existing failsafes with the
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above condition.
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This is CVE-2016-1981.
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Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
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Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
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Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
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Cc: Prasad Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
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Cc: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1296044
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Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit dd793a74882477ca38d49e191110c17dfee51dcc)
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---
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hw/net/e1000.c | 6 ++++--
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
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index bec06e9..34d0823 100644
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--- a/hw/net/e1000.c
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+++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
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@@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ start_xmit(E1000State *s)
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* bogus values to TDT/TDLEN.
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* there's nothing too intelligent we could do about this.
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*/
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- if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start) {
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+ if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start ||
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+ tdh_start >= s->mac_reg[TDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
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DBGOUT(TXERR, "TDH wraparound @%x, TDT %x, TDLEN %x\n",
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tdh_start, s->mac_reg[TDT], s->mac_reg[TDLEN]);
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break;
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@@ -1165,7 +1166,8 @@ e1000_receive_iov(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt)
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if (++s->mac_reg[RDH] * sizeof(desc) >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN])
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s->mac_reg[RDH] = 0;
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/* see comment in start_xmit; same here */
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- if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start) {
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+ if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start ||
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+ rdh_start >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
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DBGOUT(RXERR, "RDH wraparound @%x, RDT %x, RDLEN %x\n",
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rdh_start, s->mac_reg[RDT], s->mac_reg[RDLEN]);
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set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO);
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