guix/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-trust-guix-store-directory.patch
Alexey Abramov 4d3c142e0b
gnu: openssh: Trust Guix store directory
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add the patch
* gnu/packages/patches/openssh-trust-guix-store-directory.patch: Patch it
* gnu/packages/ssh.scm (openssh[source]): Use it.

Signed-off-by: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
2022-04-29 00:33:53 +02:00

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1.3 KiB
Diff

From 0d85bbd42ddcd442864a9ba4719aca8b70d68048 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Abramov <levenson@mmer.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:32:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Trust guix store directory
To be able to execute binaries defined in OpenSSH configuration, we
need to tell OpenSSH that we can trust Guix store objects. safe_path
procedure takes a canonical path and for each component, walking
upwards, checks ownership and permissions constrains which are: must
be owned by root, not writable by group or others.
---
misc.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index 0134d69..7131d5e 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -2146,6 +2146,7 @@ int
safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
{
+ static const char guix_store[] = @STORE_DIRECTORY@;
char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
char *cp;
int comparehome = 0;
@@ -2178,6 +2179,10 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ /* If we are past the Guix store then we can stop */
+ if (strcmp(guix_store, buf) == 0)
+ break;
+
if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 ||
(!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
--
2.34.0