news: Add entry for user account activation vulnerability.

* etc/news.scm: Add entry.

Co-authored-by: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
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Maxime Devos 2021-04-03 12:19:10 +02:00 committed by Ludovic Courtès
parent 2161820ebb
commit 72f911bf05
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
;; Copyright © 2021 Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
;; Copyright © 2021 Zhu Zihao <all_but_last@163.com>
;; Copyright © 2021 Chris Marusich <cmmarusich@gmail.com>
;; Copyright © 2021 Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
;;
;; Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are
;; permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice and
@ -21,6 +22,26 @@
(channel-news
(version 0)
(entry (commit "2161820ebbbab62a5ce76c9101ebaec54dc61586")
(title
(en "Risk of local privilege escalation during user account creation"))
(body
(en "A security vulnerability that can lead to local privilege
escalation has been found in the code that creates user accounts on Guix
System---Guix on other distros is unaffected. The system is only vulnerable
during the activation of user accounts that do not already exist.
The attack can happen when @command{guix system reconfigure} is running.
Running @command{guix system reconfigure} can trigger the creation of new user
accounts if the configuration specifies new accounts. If a user whose account
is being created manages to log in after the account has been created but
before ``skeleton files'' have been copied to its home directory, they may, by
creating an appropriately-named symbolic link in the home directory pointing
to a sensitive file, such as @file{/etc/shadow}, get root privileges.
See @uref{https://issues.guix.gnu.org/47584} for more information on this
bug.")))
(entry (commit "e52ec6c64a17a99ae4bb6ff02309067499915b06")
(title
(en "New supported platform: powerpc64le-linux")