* Check that the build result is owned by the build user, and that

nobody else has write permission to the build result.  This catches
  most hack attempts.
This commit is contained in:
Eelco Dolstra 2005-10-17 16:59:25 +00:00
parent 7ef574e5d0
commit 439823ae80
1 changed files with 13 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -1194,6 +1194,10 @@ void DerivationGoal::computeClosure()
% drvPath % path);
}
struct stat st;
if (lstat(path.c_str(), &st))
throw SysError(format("getting attributes of path `%1%'") % path);
startNest(nest, lvlTalkative,
format("scanning for references inside `%1%'") % path);
@ -1214,8 +1218,6 @@ void DerivationGoal::computeClosure()
/* The output path should be a regular file without
execute permission. */
struct stat st;
if (lstat(path.c_str(), &st))
throw SysError(format("getting attributes of path `%1%'") % path);
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || (st.st_mode & S_IXUSR) != 0)
throw Error(
format("output path `%1% should be a non-executable regular file")
@ -1234,6 +1236,15 @@ void DerivationGoal::computeClosure()
% path % algo % printHash(h) % printHash(h2));
}
/* Check that the output is not group or world writable, as
that means that someone else can have interfered with the
build. Also, the output should be owned by the build
user. */
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) ||
(buildUser != 0 && st.st_uid != buildUser))
throw Error(format("suspicious ownership or permission on `%1%'; rejecting this build output") % path);
/* Get rid of all weird permissions. */
canonicalisePathMetaData(path);
/* For this output path, find the references to other paths contained